Recent antitrust developments in the European Community. Address by Willy Christoph Schlieder, Director-General for Competition, to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. New York, 31 March 1976 by Schlieder, Willy Christoph.
.  ·' 
,. 
,~, ·  . 
. .  .  .. 
. .  .  ~ 
I·"''' 
RECEN'l'  ANTITRUST  DEVELOPMENTS  IN  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 
Willy Christoph  Schlieder 
Director-General  for  Competition 
';.,, 
•• 
European Communities 
.. 
Address  to 
The  Association  of  the Bar  of  the City of  New  York 
New  York,  March  31,  1976 • 
v, 
INTRODUCTION 
.  ·"  :·  . '' 
European  competition  law is often directly compared  with 
American anti-trust  law  and  for  superficial reasons  this 
makes  perfect  sense. 
The  Treaty of  Rome  was  written  about  twenty  years ago  with 
the central  purpose  of creating  a  close  economic  union  among 
the  States of Western  Europe.  The  overriding  emphasis  was 
fostering  economic  growth.  This  can  be  contrasted with  the 
environment  which  produced  American anti-trust  l~gislation 
where  a  large industrial  community  had  grown virtually un-
checked. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  two  bodies  of  law  show  more  similarities 
than  one  might  expect,  especially if one  takes  into account 
the decisions of  the  European  Commission  and  the  European 
;"  ,, 
Court.  These  decisions,  of  course,  reflect the  changing 
economic  background.  In  twenty  years  since  the creation of 
European  competition  law  the Community  has  developed  economically 
and industrially. This  is not  to  say  that we  now  have  competitiye 
.situations that are  the  same  as  in America,  but  in many  ways 
our  problems  have  become  similar  and  the  European  approach  to 
anti-trust policy has  tended naturally towards  the  adoption 
~ 
of  similar solutions. 1  -
Certainly,  the  most delicate  aspect of  our  regulatory role 
~  : .: . 
is the ·need  to  balance  the benefits generated  by  size  and 
sometimes  by  restrictive practices against  the. price  to be 
paid  in  terms  of decreased  or  threatened competition.  We  try 
to  resolve  this  problem not in abstracto but  on  a  case-by-case 
basis.  For  this  purpose,  the Commission has  issued about  a 
hundred decisions  in  individual cases.  To  this  number  we  have 
to  add  some  forty  rulings of  the  European  Court dealing with 
competition  law.  Many  of  these  cases  have  involved  American 
companies.  This  fact,  however,  should not  give  r~se to  any 
apprehension.  Under  European  competition  law all enterprises 
are  treated in  a  uniform  and  non-discriminatory  fashion, 
~ 
regardless  of whether  they are  established within or""outside 
the  Community. 
Today,  most  of  the  questions  concerning cartels can  be  considered 
itt 
as  solved.  I  sh~ll therefore  confine myself  to  a  few  specific 
problems:  industrial property rights,  the  application of 
Article  85  to selective distribution  systems,  the  analysis of 
Article  86,  and  the  problems  of  merger  control  and  joint ventures. 
I.  INDUSTRIAL  PROPERTY  RIGHTS 
Since  my last address  to the  ~ew York  Bar Association,  almost 
exactly three  years  ago,  there  have  been  a  number  of  very 
important events  in  EEC  anti-trust law affecting patents  and 
trademarks. 
I 
I 
I ------------------------------------
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..  A  real  landmark  has  be¢ntthe  adoption  of  the  European  Patent 
Convention.  It provides  for  the  setting up  of  a  European 
Patent Office,  which  will  open its doors  for  business  in 
Munich  in  about  two  years'  time.  The  European  Patent Office 
will  be  able  to grant  - on  a  single  application  - a  patent 
valid  in each of  the  Convention  countries.  Whithin  this 
framework,  special  rules will  apply  to  the  EEC  under  the 
Community  Patent Convention,  signed  on  December  15,  1975, 
at Luxembourg.  The  essential difference  between  a  European 
patent  and  the  Community  paten-t  is this:  The  European  patent, 
being  effectively  a  national patent,  is in  the main  subject 
to  national  law.  The  Community  patent is governed  by  the  body 
of  law  contained  in  the  Convention. 
To  illustrate what  this means  in practice:  The  European 
Patent  Convention  enables  a  member  country  to  provide  that  a 
;  •,\ 
European  patent shall be  effective there  for  a  shorter  term 
than  20  years  and  to  deny  the effect within its territory 
of  a  European  patent for  chemical,  pharmaceutical or  food 
products.  Such  reservations will not be  available  under  the 
·community  Patent Convention. 
.. 
·. Article  93  of  the  Con®unity 
1atent Convention  provides  that 
no  provision of  the  Cof1~/ention  "may  be  invoked  against"  the 
application of  any  provision of  the  EEC  Treaty.  In  other 
words,  Articles  85  and  86  of  the  EEC  Treaty will  apply  to 
the exercise of rights  conferred by  the  Community  patent. 
US  anti-trust laws  seem  to  have  no  precedence over  US  patent 
laws,  whereas  EEC  anti-trust  law  has  precedence  over  both 
national  and  Cooonunity  patent  law  in  case  of conflict. 
'rn  recent years,  we  have  had  a  number  of  cases which  involved 
exclusive  licences  to exploit patents  and  know-how  in  a 
Member  State of  the  EEC.  In three of  them,  we  have  held 
....  ~ ...... 
the  grant of  an  exclusive  licence  to  infringe Article  85. 
We  recognize  that normally  there  is  no  obligation upon  a 
patentee  to  grant licences,  and if he  does  grant licences  he 
is  free  to  choose  the  number  of licensees entitled to exploit 
''"  .. 
his  invention.  Our  aim is  to preserve  the  patentee's 
freedom  of  choice. 
It is not  an  automatic or per  se  rule that exclusive  licences 
·infringe  the  EEC  anti-trust laws.  We  always  have  to decide 
whether  there is an  appreciable effect on  trade  between 
Member  States.  This  involves ~onsideration of  a  number  of 
factors,  such  as  the  size  and  importance  of  the parties, 
the  significance of the  invention  and  so  on.  Furthermore, 
in holding  some  excLusive  licences  to  infringe Article  85  (1), 
we  recognize  that there  may  be  good  reason  for  licences  to be  exclusive,  f"or  example,  v. '1ere  a  1 icensee  has  to  make  a 
substantial  investment;\n  a  new  plant.  In  such  cases,  the 
Commission  has  a  discretionary power  to grant exemption  and 
in  two  of  the  cases  I  have  mentioned,  Davidson  Rubber  and 
Kabelmetal  Luchaire,  exemptions  were  granted. 
Those  two  cases  serve  as  tests for  a  so-called bloc  exemption; 
for  the  Commission  plans  to enact  such  a  bloc exemption  on 
patent licensing  agreements.  This  exemption will also deal 
with  know-how  because  treating patent licences without 
~reating know-how  would  be  impractical  :  eight out of  ten 
patent licensing agreements  contain know-how  aspects. 
By  that group  exemption  a  large part of exclusive  patent 
licences will  become  definitely authorized.  Its contents 
are st.ill subject to discussion within  the  Commission.  But 
it seems  likelY., that  the following  restrictions will  not be  .. 
permitted: 
- no-challenge  clauses; 
- extension  of  the  agreement  beyond  the life of  the most 
recent patent existing when  the  agreement was  made  unless 
there  is  a  right for  each  party  to  give  notice of 
termination; 
- non-competition clauses;  ~ 
- payment of royalties after the expiry of  the last patent; 
- tying agreements; 
- restrictions  on  the sale of  the  licensed product  (price 
fixing  or bulk restrictions); .  . 
- exclusivity of  sales  and  c  port restrictions which  exceed 
the period  necessaryi~~r a  new  product to  penetrate  a 
new  market~ 
- obligation  for the  licensee  to  use  the  licensor's 
trade  mark; 
-prohibition against  use  of  the  licensor's  know-how  after 
expiry of  the  agreement. 
The  case  of  AOIP  v.  Beyrard  involved  a  licence which  had 
no  time  limit and  could  be  extended unilaterally by  the 
inventor,  Mr.  Beyrard,  simply  by  lodging  new  improvement 
patents.  This  was  capable  of being  used  as  a  device  for 
keeping  the  licence alive.  Royalties  were  calculated on  sales 
of electrical equipment  incorporating  the  original invention, 
and  were  payable  even  after  the  relevant patent had  expired. 
Royalties  were  even payable  on  sales  by  the  licensee of 
competing  equipwent,  or  equipment which  he  had  invented  or  .. 
developed himself.  The  licence produced  the  result that, 
upon  the expiry of  the patents  under which  the original 
licence was  granted,  AOIP  would  have  to  continue  paying 
royalties  on  their equipment  ,  whereas  a  third party would 
have  been  able to manufacture  and sell equipment of  this  type 
wi~hout paying  royalties,  because  the original  invention  had 
passed  into  the  public  realm.  ~ 
.  .. - 7  . 
Raymond  Nagoyu  was  another  d·-~cision which  involved  an 
~  ·~  :' . 
exclusive  licence.  The Commission  decided  the  licence did  not 
infringe Article  85  (1),  because  the  likelihood of  importation 
into  the  EEC  of  the  licensed product was  so  small  thut it could 
be  disregarded.  However,  in  cases  where  :.~mportation or 
re-importation of  licensed products is conunercialy  viable, 
a  restriction on  sales in  the  EEC  imposed  by  licence on  an 
enterprise based outside  the  EEC  could  infringe our anti-trust 
laws. 
Another  type  of exclusive  arrangement is  exemplified  by  our 
prclirninury decision  in  the  case of  Bronbemaling v.  Heide-
maatschappij.  In  that case  a  Dutch  firm of  civil eng·ineers 
applied  for  a  patent covering  a  method  of reducing  the  level 
of  the water  table.  A  number  of  its competitors  opposed  the 
application and  the opposition resulted in  the grant of 
licences  to  e~C~ of  them.  However,  the  grant was  subject 
to  the  condition  that the patentee  should not grant any  other 
licences without  consent of  two  of  the  licensees.  In effect, 
it appears  to  be  a  case  in which  a  number  of  engineering 
companies  have  agreed  among  themselves  to  decide which, 
if any,  of  their competitors  shall be  allowed  to enter  a 
particular line of business.  The  case has  yet  to  proceed 
... 
to  a  final decision. 
I  would  like  to  add  a  few  words  on  the  Centrafarm case 
which  also  involved  t~ademarks. - 8  -
Centrafarm,  a  Dutch  firm,  bt Jght  supplies  in Britain of  a  drug 
manufactured  under  pat~J"lt and  marketed  under  the  trademark 
"Negram"  by  Sterling Winthrop  Group  Ltd.  The  result for 
Centrafarm was  a  suit for patent infringement  and  a  suit for 
trademark  infringement.  The  case  was  referred  to  the 
European  Court  which  opted  for  the principle of exhaustion of 
rights.  It held  that the nature  of  the  patentee's rights 
entitled him or  his  licensee  to  put  the  goods  into circulation 
for  the first time.  Having  done  so,  the  paten~ rights  could  not. 
be  invoked  to prevent the resale of  the  goods;  nor  could 
parallel patent rights  in other  EEC  countries.  The  Court 
applied  the  same  rule in settling the  trademark  issue  • 
......... 
The  main  thrust of  the  judgment was  under  Article  30-36  of 
the  Treaty  of  Rome.  These  are  not anti-trust provisions 
as  such;  they  govern  the free  movement  of  goods  and  are 
designed  to  acpJeve  the  integration of  the  Common  Jl1arket. 
" 
Nevertheless,  whatever  one  calls  them,  it is  now  clear that 
these Articles  forbid  a  certain type  of anti-competitive 
behaviour  - the  use  of  industrial property  rights  to  exclude 
competing  goods  from  an  EEC  country.  In  this respect  they 
· complement Article  85  of  the  Treaty. 
You  are right if you  deduce  from  what  I  have  so  far  said 
that Community  law will allow export or  import restrictions 
under  specific  and  narrowly  defined  conditions  only;  in 
general it is suspicious of  them. This  raises  the question  as  :o  iiT.port  bans  for  goods  from 
third countries.  Since, ,the  Corrununi ty is open  to  world  trade, 
I  '  ~ 
the  Commission  in not favourably  disposed  towards  such  import 
bans,  above  all if they  separate  the  Corrununity  on  the  one  hand 
and  states with  a  similar economic  structure on  the  other 
hand,  such  as  the  United States,  Canada  or Japan. 
The  Commission,  however,  is  aware  of  the  problem of  licensing 
agreements  with  countries  having  a  completely different 
economic  structure,  e.g.  the state  trading  countries.  Since 
·their export  policy is sometimes  determined  by  the  overriding 
aim of  acquiring  foreign  currency without  regard  to their 
costs of  production,  it is clear that  a  patentee  in  the 
Community,  whether  he  be  a  European or,  for  instance,  an 
American,  ought  not  to  have  to  face  competition  from  any 
licensee of his  who  markets  goods  under  those  circumstances. 
I  cannot give  you  a  definite  answer  as  to  how  the  Commission 
'li 
"  will  resolve  this  problem;  but  I  want  to  assure  you  that  the 
Commission will  find  an  answer  which will recognize  the 
legitimate interests of  the patentee.  In  the meantime,  I 
recommend  that such restrictions should be notified  to  the 
· Conuuission. 
Returning  to  the  trademark  is~ue for  the  moment,  it was 
entirely predictable that the Court would  rule  ln favour 
of  Centrafarm.  The  product  they  imported was  genuine  Negrarn. 
The  mark  indicated  ~he true origin of the  product,  and  that 
is  the  prime  function  of  a  trademark.  However,  within the  last - 10  -
two  years  there  have  been  a  1  umber  of cases  in  which  the 
same  or  a  similar  mark~hhs covered different products  of 
different manufacturers.  Two  of  these  cases  - Advocaat  Zwarte 
Kip,  and  Sirdar-Phildar - were  Commission  decisions  under Article 
85  of the  Treaty.  Both  involved  agreements  not  to  compete. 
However,  in the  Kaffee  Hag  case  there was  no  contractual  link 
between  the owners  of  the  trademark rights.  The  German 
company  had  lost its rights  to  the  trademark  in Luxembourg 
when  its Belgian  subsidiary was  sequestrated.  .Nevertheless, 
the  European  Court  decided  that the  Treaty provisions  for 
the  free  circulation of  goods  entitled the  German  company 
to sell its brand of coffee  in Luxembourg  under  the  mark 
"Hag",  which  in  Luxembourg  was  owned  by  a  Belgian  c..s.:mpany. 
The  discussion to which  this  j udc;ment  has  gi  ver1  rise covers  a 
very  broad  field,  but it is beyond  the  scope  of  this paper 
to  indicate  even  the  main  points at issue  . 
... 
" 
II.  SELECTIVE  DISTRIBUTION  SYSTEMS 
In  the area of distribution we  have  been  focussing  our 
attention recently  on  agreements  between  producers  and  dealers· 
which  establish selective distribution networks.  Such  systems 
ar~ characterized by  th~ fact  that the  sale of  products at 
the different stages  of distrihution is  limited  to  appointed 
dealers only.  The  criteria by  which  enterprises  may  be 
adrni tted as  authorized dealers  can rest on  ei  tl,er qualitative 
or quantitative  test~ or  on  a  combination of both.  These 
criteria are  generally fixed  by  the  producer  and  enforced  through - l 
contractual obligations  impo:ed  on  his  trade  partners  . 
.  ·  .  ~  :. 
'  '' 
Selective distribution systems  give  rise to  two  questions  in 
relation  to Article  85: 
- First,  to what extent are  they  caught  by  the  general  ban 
on  cartels provided  for  in Article  85  (l)  ? 
- Secondly,  when  and  under what conditions  can  they benefit 
from  an  exemption  under Article  85  (3)  ? 
As  to  the first question,  it is necessary  to  draw  a  dividing 
line between  cases in which  the producer  intends  to  ensure  a 
certain minimum  standing of  the marketed  goods  and  the  sales 
-~  .. 
outlets but not  to  limit the  number  of dealers,  and  cases  of 
quantitative  selection where  the producer  decides,  as  a  matter 
of marketing policy and  in  cooperation w:th  the dealers,  to 
distribute  his,aoods  only  through  a  given  number  of wholesalers  .. 
and  subdealers. 
In  a  recent decision  (SABA),  the  Commission  stated that 
limitations of  the kind mentioned  above  are  compatible with 
·Article  85  (l),  where 
- ~he appointment of dealers is based  on  uniform qualitative 
criteria which  are  objectively necessary  to  ensure  an 
adequate  distribution of  the  products  concerned  and 
- they  are  applied without discrimination  to all interested 
dealers. .. 
~--------~------
Whether  a  qualitative  test 1; really  necessary  to ensure  an 
adequate  distribution <fepends  mainly  on  the nature of  the 
product.  In  the  S~BA case  which  concerned  th~ distribution 
of  advanced  electronic equipment  for  domestic  leisure purposes, 
the  Commission  held  that the  criteria reJ.ating  to  the 
technical  knowledge  required  of  the  dealer  and  of his staff, 
participation by  wholesales  in  the establishment of  the 
producer's distribution  and  service  network,  the  suitability 
of  trading premises  and  the quality of  custome~ service were 
not restrictive in  the  sense of Article  85  (l).It found, 
however,  that the  SABA  agreements  included other conditions 
which  were  not  justified by  theneeds  of  adequate  distribution. 
These  conditions  concerned  the  conclusion of six  mo».~hly 
supply  contracts,  the  achievement  of  an  adequate  turnover 
and  the  acceptance  of  supply  targets,  all restrictions within 
the meaning  of Article  85  (1). 
;  ',\ 
An  enterprise which  does  not  hold  a  dominant  position is, 
of  course,  free  to  choose  its customers  at his  own  discretion. 
Our  competition rules  do  not provide  for  a  general  prohibition 
on  discrimination or  refusal  to deal.  In  most  cases of 
selective distribution,  however,  the choice of.those enterprises 
which  are  supplied by  the  manufacturer is not  a  matter  of 
unilateral  decision,  but the consequence  of  mutual  discussion 
between  the  producer  and  the dealers  concernd.  The  latter are 
willing to accept  the  requirements of  the manufacturer  only  on 
condition that the  m~nufacturer itself respects  the  conditions 
of  appointment  and  refrains  from  supplying  "outsiders". - 13  -
We  therefore  find  either  con~ractual obligations or 
i  ....  ;. 
concerted practices in :the  sense of Article  85  (1). 
The  Commission  has  been particularly reluctant  to  grant 
exemption  under Article  85  (1)  for selective distribution 
systems.  Any  limitation on  sales between  manufacturers  and 
main distributors,  between  main  distributors  and  ultimate 
customers,  are  justifiable only if they result in substantial 
advantages  for  the  consumer  in particular in  a;downward 
trned  in prices  in  the various  Merober  States.  Generally, 
an  exemption will  be  considered  only  when  dealers,  apart 
from  their function  as  distributors,  perform certain services 
that necessarily depend  on  constant close  cooperat~Qn ·between 
producer  and  seller.  Moreover,  the  nature  and  the extent 
of  the  restrictions  iP1posed  on  the  parties  concerned have 
to  be  taken  into  account. 
;" 
In  the  BMW  case,  the  Commission  has  considered  the  specific 
economic  and  technical  factors  of  the  case.  It underlined 
that 
- a  motor  car  is an expensive  product of  great technical 
complexity  which  need  repair services  and  that constant 
~hecks are  therefore  necessary; 
- the  requisite after-sales service must  be  of high quality 
not  only  in order  to satisfy the  individual  needs  of  each 
driver in the  proper  functioning of his vehicle,  but also, 
as  a  matter  of  gen~ral public interest,  in order  to  ensure 
road  safety  and  environmental  protection; i. (~  -
the quality of  this  servic~ is best assured when  manufacturer 
and  seller have  a  clb~e relationship of mutual  confidence 
and  this  would  be  difficult to  achieve  if manufacturers 
had  to maintain  trading relations with  too  many  dealers. 
The  Commission  finally held  that such  advantages  were  in 
some  considerable  measure  in  the  interest of  consumers  and 
could  not  be  achieved  to  the  same  extent or with  equal  chance 
of  success  by  other means. 
In both  cases  the  Commission  took  care  to  ensure  that the 
selective distribution  system did not  inhibit advantageous 
sales  to  consumers  through  enterprises operating at low  prices  •  .., ..... 
BMW  and  SABA  have  both  been  obliged  to  submit  annual  reports 
setting out all  cases of refusal  to  appoint  a  dealer or of 
withdrawal  of  such  an  appointment. 
III.  ANALYSIS  OF  ARTICLE  86 
1)  Dominant  Position 
A;ticle  86  does  not deiine what  a  dominant position is.  It 
is therefore  the  task of  the  Gommission  and  of  the  Court 
of Justice to develop  suitable criteria which  are flexible 
enough  to fit the  various  kinds  of domination. 
·. - l5  -
In its  "Memorandum  on  concen .:.ration  of  enterprises in  the 
: 
I,-.,  •· 
Common. Market'  of  1965:,.- 'the  Commission  said  : 
"It is primarily  a  matter of  economic  power,  namely  the 
capability of exerting an  influence  on  the market  that is 
substantial  and  also in principle foreseeable  for  the 
dominant  enterprise.  This  economic  ability of  a  dominant 
enterprise influences  the market behaviour  and  the  economic 
decisions  of other enterprises,  regardless of whether it is 
used  in  a  specific sense. 
In  the Continental  Can  case,  the  Commission  stated: 
_...'lo 
"Enterprises  are  in  a  dominant position when  they  have  the 
power  to  behave  independently without  taking into account, 
to  any  substantial extent,  their competitors,  purchasers  and 
suppliers.  Sucb  is  the  case where  the enterprises,  because 
. .. 
of  their market  share or of  their market  share  combined  with 
availability of  technical  knowledge,  raw materials or capital, 
have  the  power  to  determine  prices or  to  control production 
or distribution of  a  signific~nt part of  the  goods  in question. 
This  power  does  not necessarily have  to  derive  from  an 
ab$olute  domination  enabling  the  dominant enterprise  to  disregard 
.. 
the wishes  of other enterprises participating in  the market. 
It suffices that it is  strong  enough  to  ensure  an  overall 
independence  of behaviour,  even if there  are  differences  in 
the  intensity and  the  extent of their influence  on  the 
different submarkets." The  Commission  took  into  acLount not only  the  share of  the 
market  held  by  the  gr¢0~ but also  the  group's  advantages 
over  its competitors  resulting  from  its size and  its economic, 
financial  and  technological  importance,  particularly 
- its technological  predominance  through  patents  and 
know-how, 
- the  wide  range  of its output  and  the geographical  spread 
of  it~ factories  and  warehouses, 
- the  availability of  the necessary machinery Jor manufacture 
and  use  of metal  containers, 
- the  possibility of obtaining capital  from  the international 
markets. 
In  the  United  Brand  case,  UBC  was  found  to  be  in  a  dominant 
position as  a  supplier of  some  40  per  cent of the  bananas 
sold  in  the  Community  and with  a  market  share  of  about  45  per 
cent in the relevant geographic  market  consisting of Benelux,  .. 
Denmark  and  Germany.  The  Commission  stressed  that  UBC  sold 
appreciably  more  than  any  other  company  carrying on  business 
in the  European  banana market.  Its  two  most  important 
competitors  held  shares of  15-20  per  cent  and  10-12  per  cent 
respectively in  the part of  the  Community  which  forms  the 
relevant market. 
.. 
Besides  the quantitative criteria concerning  the  market  structure 
the  Commission  lists other elemeffiswhich  substantiate  the 
dominant  position of.  UBC.  The  decision  takes  into  account, 
among  other  factors: 7  -
-the strong vertical integr.tion of  UBC's  banana  business 
from  the  plantation _t6;·marketing,  reinforced  by  the fact  that 
it also operates  on  other areas  complementing its banana 
trade; 
UBC's  very  important position in a  number  of  tropical 
banana  producing  countries  as  a  result of its control 
over plantations  and of the  numerous  contractual  and 
financial  links which it has  in  these  countries; 
- UBC' s  strong position on  the world  banana  ~;1ar)<et  where  it 
controls about  35  per cent of  the world's  entire banana 
exports; 
- UBC's  ownership of  a  large  fleet  of refrigerator ships, 
essential  for  the  transport of  bananas  from  the  pr9Pucer  -
countries  to  Europe; 
- the  extensive  know-how  UBC  has  acquired  thanks  to its 
research  into  new  and  better varieties; 
the great  fin~ncial power  and  the  reduced  risk which  UBC  .. 
derives  from its multinational organization  and  from its 
status  as  a  conglomerate. 
Other  cases  decided  by  the  Commission  did  not  require  such 
a  full  and  complete  economic  evaluation.  In  thE)  "Sugar"  case 
(1973),  the existence  of  a  dominant  position  was  proved 
by  the market  share  that each  (H  the  groups  in  question held 
in its  "home  market".  These  shares  amounted  respectively 
to  85  per  cent,  85  per  cent  and  90-95  per cent.  The  Commission's 
point of  view  was  confirmed  by  the  Court of Justice which  stated - LS  -
that  a  market  share  of  85  per  cent is in itself sufficient 
·"'  .'' 
to  constitute  a  domina~t position  and  that further evidence 
was  therefore not necessary. 
At first sight  the  views  of  the  European  Court  seem  to differ, 
at least to  some  extent,  from  those  of  the Commission.  In 
several  rulings  ("Parke  Davis",  "Sirena",  "Deutsche  Gramrnophon"), 
the Court  considered that the  existence of  ct  dominant position 
within  the  Common  Market or within  a  substantial part of it 
was  clearly established when  the enterprise  concerned,  either 
on  its own  or  jointly with other enterprises,  could  hinder 
effective  competition  in  large parts of  the market,  taking 
into account  the possible existence of  producers  mar~eting 
similar  types  of  goods  and  their position on  the market. 
I  cannot  see  any  substantial difference  between  the  views 
of  the  Court  an~ of  the  Commission.  Differences  in wording 
are  due  to  the  fact  that the  Corrunission,  when  taking  an 
individual decision,  has  to  adapt its definition to  the 
circumstances  of  the  given  case. 
According  to Article  1  of  the proposal  for  a  regulation 
on'merger  control,  concentrations  are  incompatible with  the 
.. 
Common  Barket  when  the parties involved acquire  or enhance 
the  power  to hinder effective competition in  the  Common  Market 
or  in  a  substantial part of it.  This  text is completed 
by  the  following  word~: .9  -
"The  power  to  hinder effectire competition  shall  be  appraised 
by  reference  in  partich~ar to  the  extent to which  suppliers 
and  consumers  have  ~ possibility of  choice,  t~ the  economic  and 
financial  power  of  the enterprises  concerned,  to  the structure 
of  the markets  affected,  and  to  supply  and  demand  trends  for 
the  relevant  goods  or services". 
2)  "One  or more  enterprises" 
Article  86  can  also  be  applied  to  a  dominant  position held 
by  several enterprises. 
There  are  three possible  situations: 
a)  several enterprises,  though  legally independent, 
are  connected  in one  group.  They  can  therefore  be 
regarded  as  serving one  economic  purpose.  In  such  a 
case  the  market positions of  the enterprises  involved  .. 
have  to  be  taken  together.  This  principle was  applied 
in the Court's ruling in  "Deutsche  Grarnrnophon",  p.nd 
"Commercial  Solvents". 
b)  Several  firms  are  connected  by  cartel agreement,  a 
decision  of  their professional  association or by  concerted 
practices.  This  case~  too,  meets  the  requirements  of 
a  jointly held dominant position,  if the  enterprises 
in question  together  have  the  power  to hinder 
effective  c<?mpetition.  In its "Sugar"  decision,  the - .::o  -
Commission  found  tl, 1t  this was  true  of  the  Suddeutsche 
Zuckerverkauf's'-'cescllschaft,  a  joint selling organization 
covering  certain producers  in Southeo1  Germany,  and  of 
the  two  Dutch  sugar manufacturers  CSM  and s.u., 
which  sold their products  separately but applied 
common  prices  and other trading  terms. 
c)  Several enterprises are  in an  oligopolistic situation. 
As  I  see it,to constitute  a  jointly held  dominant 
position,  a  certain parallelism of conduct  among 
the several  independent firms  is required at least. 
It is likely that this parallelism of  conduct  has  to 
be  shown  in  the  specific area where  the  alleged  abuse 
takes  place.  A  procedure still pending  before  the 
Commission  against  several oil companies  in  Hollund 
which  each  had  refused  to supply  an  independent 
wholes~ler indicates that the  Commission  does  not, 
" 
per  se,  exclude  the  application of Article  86  to 
parallel behaviour  of enterprises  in  an  oligopolistic 
market. 
3)  The  relevant market 
Following  the definition  which~the Commission  has  repeatedly 
given  in regulations,  draft regulations  and official notices, 
the  relevant market  includes  "identical products  and  products 
which,  by  reason  of  their characteristics,  their price and :1  -
the  use  for  which  they  are  i11tended,  may  be  regarded  as  similar 
I..,,, 
to  the  consumer" •  : , 
'I'he  Court  of Justice,  in  the  "Sirena"  case,  underlined  the 
necessity  to  take  into account  the  existence of  producers 
marketing  identical,  similar or  interchange~ble goods.  In 
Continental  Can,  the Court  said: 
"In  fact,  the  question whether  there  is still a  chance  for 
effective competition must  be  evaluated by  considering the 
specific characteristics  that qualify  a  product as particularly 
suitable for  satisfying a  constant demand  and  thus  less 
interchangeable with  other products." 
A  critical point  in  many  decisions  is whether  the  dominant 
position  concerns  a  relatively large market or  one  or  more 
submarkets.  Iri"the Continental  Can  case,  the  Court  annulled  .. 
the decision  for  lack of  a  clear definition of  the  relevant 
m.:..trket.  In  the  case  "Kali  & Salz/Kalichemie"  (Article  85) 
concerning  simple  and  composed  fertilizers,  the  Court  held 
that there was  a  certain degree  of  interchangeability  between 
the  two  products,  and  they  therefore  had  to be  considered 
as.one  market.  These  two  examples  show  that lawyers  have  a 
.. 
good  chance  of  contesting the validity of  the  Commission's 
market definition even  if economists  would  go  along with it, 
though  the  outcome  before  the Court will be  as  hazardous 
as  in  the u.s. - ~2  -
One  point  seems  to  be  clear:  if there  can  be  no  reasonable 
doubt  about  the  market: 'd'efin  i tion,  the  economic  importance 
of  the market is not  relevant.  In  the General  Motors  case, 
the Court of Justice  held  that  the  delivery of certificates 
of  conformity  for  cars  sold outside  the official distribution 
ne~work - which  was  a  very  small business  - was  a  relevant 
market within  the  meaning  of Article  86. 
Geographically,  the dominant position must  exist  "in the 
Common  Market  or  in  a  substantial part thereof".  As  dominant 
positions  in  the  Common  Market  as  a  whole  are  relatively 
rare,  most  interest is generally directed to the  question  of 
what  part of  the  Community  can  be  considered  as  "su_l?~~tantial". 
As  the  Court of  Justice  stated in  the  "Sugar"  case,  it is 
necessary  to  take  into account  the  structure and  the  extent 
of production  ~pd consumption  of  the  goods  concerned,  the 
patterns of  conduct of  sellers  and  purchasers,  their 
economic possibilities,  the cost of  transport,  the preferences 
of  customers  and  consumers  and  the  fact  that  a  given territory 
is or is  not  isolated from  other territories of  the  Community 
'by  natural,  technical,  economic or other reasons • 
.. 
.  · 3  -
( 4)  The  abuse  of  a  dominu.n t  position 
In  the  view of  some  authors  the wording  of Article  86 
appeared  to  support  the  argument  that the  dominant  position 
must  have  been  used  as  an  instrument  for  the  improper 
behaviour.  In  addition  to  that it was  argued,  that  "abuse" 
would  imply  the existence of the additional  element of 
"deliberateness"  and  that Article  86  would  concern  only 
abusive  conduct  on  the mu.rket. 
These  interpretations neglect the close links  between 
the  general  aims  of the Treaty  and  the  competi_!:hon  rules. 
According  to  the Commission1  "Conduct of  an 
enterprise  amounts  to  improper  exploitu.tion if,  from  u.n 
objective,;;<iewpoint and  in  the  light of  the  goals  set 
forth  in  the  Treaty,  it must  be  characterized as  misconduct. 
Improper  exploitation by  a  dominant  enterprise can manifest 
itself in  conduct  toward  present competitors,  potential 
competitors,  suppliers,  and  consumers.  The  standard  to 
to  be  applied in deciding what  constitutes  improper  exploitation 
must  be  derived  from  the  objS3ctive  of  the  norm  in which  tha.t 
concept  is used."  .. 
" ...  Consequently,  neither a  cartel  (on  account of Article 
85  (3) '(b)  nor  an  enterprise occupying  a  dominant 
position is permitted to  eliminate competition  by  creating 
·. 
a  monopolistic  situation." 4  -
: ....  ·  .. 
Under  this  concept there  is no  room  either  for 
the  theory of  "instrument"  or  for  that of  "deliberateness." 
The  dominant  position constitutes  an  objective  condition 
for  taking action against certain practices which  are  permissible 
in  a  normal  competitive  situation but not  for  dominant  firms 
because of  the  prejudice  they  cause  to  competition  in 
general  and  to  the  interests of  competitors,  suppliers, 
customers  and  consumers  in particular. 
There  is also no  reason  to  confine Article  86  to  conduct 
... ~1-
on  the  market  and  exclude  from its application mergers 
set up  within  the  framework  of  a  dominant  position.  This 
viewpoint  is  underlined by  the  examples  of  abuses  listed 
in Article  86(b)  and  was  confirmed by  the  Court of Justice, 
Ia 
in its "Cort'tinental  Can"  decision. 
The  decision  in  the  "Commercial  Solvents"  case  involved 
the  problem of  refusal  to  supply.  The  Court held that 
"an  undertaking being in  a  dominant  position as  regards 
the  production of  a  raw  material  and  therefore  able  to 
control  the  supply  to  manufacturers  of derivatives  cannot,  .. 
just because it decides  to  start manufacturing  these 
derivatives  (in  competition with its  former  customers), 
act in  such  a  way  as  to  eliminate  their competition which, 
in  the  case  in  ~uestion, would  have  amounted  to eliminating 
one  of  the  principal manufacturers  of ethambutol  in  the 
common  market ...  " Another  interestiri~··asp0ct to  the  interpretation of 
Article  86  was. added  by  the decision  in  t.be  "Sugar"  case. 
One  of  the  major  features  of this  case  was  the  fact 
that an  enterprise  in  a  dominant  position  had  granted 
fidelity  rebates  to its customers.  Both  the Commission 
and  the  Court of Justice  treated that as  an  abuse.  While 
quantity  rebates  can  be  accepted  as  a  means  of rationalization 
of distribution,  fidelity rebates  were  found  to  be  in-
compatible  with Article  86.  The  Court  gave  three  reasons: 
The  system  produces  the  result that  two  enterprises 
which  each  buy  the  same  quantity of  goods  from  the  same 
~  ...  ~ 
producer  have  to  pay  different prices where  one  of  them 
has  also been  supplied  by  a  second  producer. 
The  system of  fidelity rebates curtails or  even  excludes 
" 
the possibility of other producers  com~eting witi1  the 
dominant enterprise in  the  sales  market. 
Fidelity rebates  are  likely to  enhance  the  dominant 
position of an  enterprise in relation ot its competitors. 
Another  kind of price  dis~rimination may  in  future 
require  more  and  more  of  our attention.  The  question 
is  to  what extent  a  dominant enterprise  can  apply  different 
prices  in different parts of  the  common  market without 
infringing Article  86  (c) . : ...... 
'I'he  European  Court has  ruled  (DGG/METRO)  that such  a  policy 
does  not constitute  in itself an  abuse  of  a  dominant  position, 
but that differences  in price  from  one  Nember  State  to 
another  may  become  a  determining  factor of evidence  for 
an  infringement of Article  86  if they  are  important 
and  not  justified on  objective  grounds.  According  to  the 
Commission  this is  the situation in  the  United  Brand  case. 
An  analysis  of  UB's  pricing activities revealed  that 
although  there were  only marginal  differences  in  ship~ing 
and  handling costs  between  Chiquita  bananas  arriving at 
the  two  ports of entry  (Rotterdam  and  Bremerhavq_n) ,  prices  ............. 
to  customers  on  the  same  conditions of  sale  and  payment 
(free  on  rail)  were  drastically different.  No  economic 
justification could  be  found  for  these  differences  . 
.  ..  .. 
Apart  from  the  aspect of price discrimination  this  case 
also  involves  a  problem of abusive  pricing.  According 
to Article  86  (a)  an  abuse  may  consist in  imposing  unfair 
purchase  or  selling prices or other unfair trading  conditions. 
The  reason  is that Article  86  is not only  intended  to 
assure  the  survival of remaining  competition,  but also 
to  protect  the  consumer  d~rectly where  competition  is 
no  longer  working effectively.  In  the  GM  case  the  Court 
of  Justice  found  that an  abuse  under Article  86  (a)  may 
consist in  charging  a  price  that,  in  comparison  with ~ 7  -
the economic  value of  the service  concerned  is  excessive. 
The  assessment of  the economic  value  of  goods  or services 
constitutes  a  delicate  task  that  the  Commission  can  accomplish 
only if it finds  means  of evidence)outside of  a  detailed 
analysis of  the cost situation)that the  price is excessive. 
It has  been  argued  that,  for  the  purpose of Article  86, 
only markets  characterized by  the  same  structure  and  the 
same  degree  of  competition  could  be  compared  with  each 
other.  In  the  drug markets,  for  example,  we  a~e confronted 
w~ th  a  system of administered  prices  in  some  Member  Stu.tes  . 
and  unchecked  pricing practices  in others.  I  see  no  reason 
for  preventing the  Commission  from  comparing  the  administered 
prices  wit~ the prices  practiced in  countries without price 
control if the  company  lives with  the  administered  prices 
over  a  longer  period of  time.  It is certainly not realistic 
to  u.ssume  that the  national  Governments  in  the  Community, 
1n  administering  a  system of price control,  neglect  the  economic 
situation of  the  industry. 
To  bring suits  for  "overc~arging," of course,  constitutes 
a  serious  interference with  the  economic  freedom of  the 
enterprises  involved.  But  the political decision of  the 
legislator has  to be  respected.  Yet,  the  power  used 
under  this provision by  the authority ought  to  be  handled 
with  the greatest care  in order to  avoid  the  role of  a ,, 
'8  -
::  .... :;. 
price  commissioner.  Orclers  to  reduce  prices  therefore 
may  be  rare.  They  are  acceptable  only where  absolute 
priority  has  to  be  given  to  the  protection of  the  consumer. 
During  recent years  the overall picture regarding  the  application 
of Article  86  has  certainly changed  drastically.  Conflicts 
between  large corporations  and  the  Commission  have  become 
more  frequent.  Obviously  many  questions  arising  under Article 
86  still await answers  but  I  think  that the European 
Commission  and  the  Court of Justice have  already  provided 
useful  guidelines  to  enterprises  in  a  number  of areas. 
1.·16,tl 
...  I . . 
... )  -
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:  '·. 
1V.  f1ERGER  CON'rROL  1\ND  JOINT  VENTURES 
The  Commission  has  professed its resoluteness  to  make  use 
of its power  under Article  86  to oppose  unlawful  concentration. 
One  should,  however,  keep  in  mind  that European  competition  law, 
as  it stands  now,  does  not suffice  for  a  systematic  merger  contrc 
which  is necessary  to  assure workable  competition within  the 
common  market.  We  have  a  vital interest to  prevent  the 
formation  of dominant  positions,  for  dominance  means  that 
competition  is  no  longer effective. 
The  draft regulation  submitted  to  the  Council  of  Ninisters 
....,..  .. -,.. 
therefore  provides  for  extension of  the  powers  of  the  Commission. 
It also  provides  for  specific procedures.  According  to  that 
bill: 
1.  Concentrations  by which  the enterprises  involved  acquire 
;  ~ ' 
or  enha~ce  th~ power  to hinder effective competition  in 
the  common  market or  a  substantial part thereof,  are 
incompatible with  the  common-market if trade between 
Menilier  States is liable to  be  affected.  Concentrations 
on  a  smaller scale which  do  not  give  such  power  are 
not caught by  this rule as  long  as  they  do  not  exceed 
certain quantitative limits  .  .. 
2.Concentrations  which are  indispensable  to  the  attainment 
of  an  objective  given priority treatment  by  the  Community 
may  be  held  n·ot  to  be  incompatible with  the  Common  Market. ·U  -
I  .~  '• 
During  the  debate  in  a  working  group  of  the  Council  of  ~1inisters 
amendments  have  been  suggested but  there is  general  agreement 
to  go  ahead with  the  preparation of  a  final draft.  The  most 
controversial  issues  concern  the  problems  of  reconciling 
national  industrial,  social  and  regional  policies with 
merger  decisions  taken  by  Corrununity  authorities,  the parallel 
application of  Community  and  national  law  in  the  area of merger 
control  and  the  participation of  Member  States  in  the  decision 
making  process.  Though  I  am  unable  to predict when  the 
merger  regulation will  become  law,  I  am  confident  that it will 
happen  in  a  not  too  distant future  and  that this  new  piece 
... lo···'"' 
of  legiS..ation will  corroborate effectively  the  Competition  90licy 
of  the  Community. 
i  ,, 
In  connecti'on with  the  merger  problem  I  would  like  to  add 
a  few  remarks  on  the  joint venture,  that chameleon  of  the 
anti-trust world.  The  treatment of  joint ventures  under 
European  competition  law,  constitutes one  of  today's  most 
acute  problems.  The  main  question is to what  extent respectively 
the  rules  on  restrictive  practices or  those  on  mergers  apply. 
We  have  to  decide  at the  beginning of  a  procedure  whether  the  .. 
joint venture  constitutes  a  cartel under Article  85  or has 
to  be  considered as  a  merger.  In  the latter case application 
of Article  85  is excluded;  action could at present be  taken 
only  under Article  86  and  then  only if the  rather special 
conditions  for  the  application of that Article  to  mergers 
are  present. 1  -
:1  .-"::· 
It should  be  noticed  that  the  problem of  joint ventures  under 
our  rules  can  be  confined  to  situations where  the  jointly 
owned  subsidiary  constitutes  a  genuine  economic  entity. 
Where,  on  the  contrary,  the  joint venture  is only  a  means 
of pooling  some  of  the  functions  of  the  parent  companies,  we 
are  clearly in  the  field of restrictive practices.  The 
Commission  has  confirmed  this  concept  in  many  decisons  related 
to  joint selling,  joint purchasing,  joint research  and  develop-
ment  and  joint manufacturing.  Each  of  these  cases  has  been 
examined exclusively under Article  85. 
Even  in  the  absence  of particular agreements  or concerted 
practices,  we  may  assume  that restrictive behaviour  can  be 
an  automat'±c  con~equence if the  parties  involved  in  a 
joint venture  remain  competitors;  we  call  a  restrictive 
effect which  could  in such  circumstances  jeopardize  the  economic 
independence  of  the parties  a  "group effect." 
The  crucial question is whether  cooperation  in  the  framework 
of  the  coMGon  subsidiary is likely to restrict or  to  lessen 
... 
competition.  The  ans\ver  depends  on  the  circumstances of  the 
case.  As  long  as  the parent companies  or one  of  them  still 
operate  in  the  geographic  and  product market of  the  co~non 
subsidiary,  res~rictions in  the  sense of Article  85  are  probable. )2  -
This  may  also  be :t:t'ue  of  cases  where  the  parent  companies 
and  the  joint venture are  present in difterent but economically 
connected  markets  (raw  material,  semifinished product,  final 
product) .  Even  in  cases  where  neither parent  company  has 
ever operated in  the  market of  the  joint venture,  restrictive 
effects  may  be  found,  if we  can  prove  a  likelihood that 
each of  the  parent companies  would  have  entered  that 
market separately. 
~n1en  undertakings  transfer all their assets  to a·joint 
venture  and  become  management  holding companies,  they are 
no  longer  competitors.  Such  operations  amounS,,);.o  total 
integration  and  must  be  regarded  as  concentrations.  The 
Commission  has  expressed  this  view  in  the  case Agfa-Gevaert 
and  Dunlop-Pirelli,  where  the  parent  companies  formed  a 
series of  •. joint ventures  in different Member  States  by 
total  transfers of assets.  In its recent decision  giving 
negative  clearance  in  the  case  of  SI-iV/Chevron,  the  Commission 
took  the  same  view  in circumstances  of  a  partial integration, 
where  th~ parties retained their·own  economic  activities,· 
although  not in  the  same  fields  as  their  joint ventures. 
The  concept of partial in"'t.egration  should,  however,  be 
handled  with  care.  In  the Bayer/Gist-Brocades  case  the 
Commission  objected  to  the  establishment of  jointly owned 
subsidiaries to which  the parties wished  to  transfer their 
penicillin processing plants.  The  Commission  found  that ..  . 
I  ~  '• 
: '' 
this arrangement. would  not only have  given ·them  the  power 
to  control  production  and  investments  at~he raw material 
stage  and  the  stage  of  intermediate penicillin  products, 
but would  also  have  had  negative effects  on  their competitive 
behaviour  in  the markets  of semi-synthetics  and  branded 
preparations,  where  they were  actual or at least potential 
competitors.  The  parties involved  have  therefore  replaced 
their initial contracts'by  a  long-term specialization 
agreement  that the  Commission  was  able  to  exempt  under 
Article  85  ( 3)  . 
*** 
Since  I  last spoke  to  you  some  years  ago  there  have  been 
fo.r-reaching  developments  in  the  application of Articles  85 
and  86.  '!'Be  Commission  is gaining experience  and  hopefully 
a  certain  degree  of maturity  in its approach  to  the 
problems  of competition.  On  the  other  hand,  the business 
coMnunity  has  learned  the  importance  of  taking  the  European 
c~mpetition rules  seriously into  account. 
However,  I  can  assure  you  that this experience  and maturity 
.. 
brings with it also better  judgement  and  a  sense of  fair-
play,  and  to  that can  be  added  the  tight control  imposed 
by  the  European  Court of  Justice  over  the acts of  the 
Commission.  Nev~rtheless,  those  doing business  in  the 
Community  and  having anti-trust questions will be  well . , 
' .  : .  "  ~ . 
, ... 
advised  not  only  to  seek  the best possible  legal  advice 
but also,  if I  may  be  permitted  to  say  so,  to  take it  . 
.  I ·U  .. 